10.11: Difference between revisions
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=== Election Anomalies === | === Election Anomalies === | ||
Allegation 3-5 Two people IT Two different parties for drop box | |||
===== [[Dropbox Collection (2020)|Maricopa Dropbox Collection (2020)]] ===== | |||
Governance issues identified from [https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/2020_General_Election_Investigation_Summary.pdf Arizona Attorney General's Office 2020 General Election Investigation] of Arizona Senate allegations of Maricopa County Election Department - Drop Box Collections issues. | |||
There is a relationship between these MC Drop Box anomalies and this Green Book attribute statement: "Generally, the higher the risk of an unintended event or result occurring, the stronger or more robust the control activities need to be to effectively mitigate the higher risk to acceptable levels." | |||
Ordinarily, 56,000 undeliverable pieces of first-class mail under USPS control would be a non-issue. Why should a citizen care as long as they receive their mail. Concern grows when 56,000 valid ballots are under USPS control. See the heading [[Dropbox Collection (2020)#Deviation: Fictious Addresses in the MC Voter Registration Database|Deviation: Fictious Addresses in MC Voter Registration Database]] from Maricopa Dropbox Collection (2020) webpage for more details. | |||
The unintended consequences are these early ballots (technically considered first-class mail) may become weaponized against some of the public if any portion of these valid ballots are acquired (''stolen)'' from the USPS by fraudsters. Election outcomes can be fraudulently swayed. Election procedures focus on ensuring each ballot is counted once the ballot enters the process for tabulation. Virtually, no effort has been taken to secure and control the tens of thousands of undeliverable, but still valid, early ballots that can be used for fraud if they fall in the wrong hands. | |||
===== [[Signature Verification|Maricopa County Signature Verification (2020)]] ===== | ===== [[Signature Verification|Maricopa County Signature Verification (2020)]] ===== | ||
Governance issues identified from [https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/2020_General_Election_Investigation_Summary.pdf Arizona Attorney General's Office 2020 General Election Investigation] of Arizona Senate allegations of Maricopa County - Signature Verification Process issues. There are three paths to ensuring a valid early ballot is tabulated, which are 1) Signature Verifier may allow the ballot to pass through directly to tabulation, 2) an early ballot flagged by the Signature Verifier may be cured or authenticated by a separate team, and 3) a citizen may confirm their vote has been tabulated. Meanwhile, the Signature Verifier is the single person that has the responsibility of detecting a potentially fraudulent ballot. There are fewer methods to detect fraud than there are to authenticate a valid early ballot. | Governance issues identified from [https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/2020_General_Election_Investigation_Summary.pdf Arizona Attorney General's Office 2020 General Election Investigation] of Arizona Senate allegations of Maricopa County - Signature Verification Process issues. There are three paths to ensuring a valid early ballot is tabulated, which are 1) Signature Verifier may allow the ballot to pass through directly to tabulation, 2) an early ballot flagged by the Signature Verifier may be cured or authenticated by a separate team, and 3) a citizen may confirm their vote has been tabulated. Meanwhile, the Signature Verifier is the single person that has the responsibility of detecting a potentially fraudulent ballot. There are fewer methods to detect fraud than there are to authenticate a valid early ballot. | ||
Latest revision as of 16:52, 27 August 2026
Control Activities
Principle 10 - Design Control Activities
Attribute 10.11 - Management evaluates the purpose of the control activity as well as the likelihood of an unintended event or result occurring and the magnitude of impact it would have on the entity in achieving its objectives. Management may design both preventive and detective control activities to effectively mitigate the risks to achieving the objectives, particularly in circumstances where the risk of an unintended event or result occurring is high. Generally, the higher the risk of an unintended event or result occurring, the stronger or more robust the control activities need to be to effectively mitigate the higher risk to acceptable levels.
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Jamie's Story
No examples are available to illustrate governance gaps for this attribute.
Election Anomalies
Allegation 3-5 Two people IT Two different parties for drop box
Governance issues identified from Arizona Attorney General's Office 2020 General Election Investigation of Arizona Senate allegations of Maricopa County Election Department - Drop Box Collections issues.
There is a relationship between these MC Drop Box anomalies and this Green Book attribute statement: "Generally, the higher the risk of an unintended event or result occurring, the stronger or more robust the control activities need to be to effectively mitigate the higher risk to acceptable levels."
Ordinarily, 56,000 undeliverable pieces of first-class mail under USPS control would be a non-issue. Why should a citizen care as long as they receive their mail. Concern grows when 56,000 valid ballots are under USPS control. See the heading Deviation: Fictious Addresses in MC Voter Registration Database from Maricopa Dropbox Collection (2020) webpage for more details.
The unintended consequences are these early ballots (technically considered first-class mail) may become weaponized against some of the public if any portion of these valid ballots are acquired (stolen) from the USPS by fraudsters. Election outcomes can be fraudulently swayed. Election procedures focus on ensuring each ballot is counted once the ballot enters the process for tabulation. Virtually, no effort has been taken to secure and control the tens of thousands of undeliverable, but still valid, early ballots that can be used for fraud if they fall in the wrong hands.
Governance issues identified from Arizona Attorney General's Office 2020 General Election Investigation of Arizona Senate allegations of Maricopa County - Signature Verification Process issues. There are three paths to ensuring a valid early ballot is tabulated, which are 1) Signature Verifier may allow the ballot to pass through directly to tabulation, 2) an early ballot flagged by the Signature Verifier may be cured or authenticated by a separate team, and 3) a citizen may confirm their vote has been tabulated. Meanwhile, the Signature Verifier is the single person that has the responsibility of detecting a potentially fraudulent ballot. There are fewer methods to detect fraud than there are to authenticate a valid early ballot.
