Dropbox Collection (2020)

This page seeks to explain Maricopa Dropbox Collection (2020) anomalies as identified on the Election Anomalies page, which is a collection of various election-related anomalies that illustrate poor governance. Governance Gaps are reported on and compared to a standard so that you may visualize how poorly managed County services can have an adverse impact without any criminal wrongdoing. We chose the United States Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (also known as the Green Book) because it represents the ideal standard for governance practices since it is specifically written for government entities, not the business sector. Maricopa County has no obligation or commitments to adhere to any governance-related standards, including the Green Book. Regardless, the Green Book is a representation of what good governance looks like and deviations from that standard are worthy of consideration, not prosecution.

A diagram of one of many methods of compromising Election Integrity is shown of the Fraud Flow Diagram page. This page is devoted to understanding issues with Dropbox Collection anomalies within Maricopa County during the 2020 General Election, which includes Fraudulent Ballots Collected, Fraudulent Ballots Transported and Fraudulent Ballots Received from the Fraud Flow Diagram page

AZ Attorney General Investigation

Potential Governance Gaps were identified with the Arizona Attorney General's Office's 2020 General Election Investigation report. Drop Box Collection issues were investigated in Section 2 of this report, which address an Allegation that "Maricopa County Elections Department failed to maintain chain of custody. Properly document ballot retrieval, transport and count of Drop-Off & Drop-Box ballots."

The summary of the allegation is as follows;

Maricopa County Elections Department failed to maintain chain of custody. Properly document ballot retrieval, transport and count of Drop-Off & Drop-box ballots.

The AZ AG's inspector makes some interesting observations in Section 2 of the report, which are described below.

Requirements for Pick Up, Transport and Receipt of Drop-off and Drop-box ballots

Maricopa County & Arizona State Elections Procedures

The facts stated in this section are from the AZ AG's investigations. The inspector is presenting election-related requirements as specified in the Arizona Secretary of States (SOS) Elections Procedure Manual (EPM) and the Maricopa County Election Procedures. The AZ SOS EPM is accessible to the public from the AZ SOS website, including the 2019 SOS EPM edition, which would have been in place during the 2020 General Election. Maricopa County does not post their version of Election Procedures, which the AZ AG's inspector reviewed.

The following Arizona and Maricopa County requirements are stated in the inspector's report:

1. When the secure ballot container is opened by the County Recorder or officer in charge of elections (or designee), the number of ballots inside the container shall be counted and noted on the retrieval form.
2. For any election that includes a partisan race, at least two designated ballot retrievers of at least two differing party preferences shall be assigned to retrieve voted ballots from a ballot drop-off location or drop box.

The Arizona Revised Statues (A.R.S.), 16-509. Delivery of ballots to election officers, requires the following as relevant to drop-off and drop-box collections:

• The board of supervisors, city or town clerk or governing body of a special district shall deliver, by mail or other reliable method, to each voting precinct or to the inspector of each election board as determined by the officer in charge of elections one package containing the required number of ballots, at least forty-eight hours before the hour for opening the polls on election day, unless prevented by some unavoidable delay or accident which shall be established by affidavit of election officers or bearers of ballots. The official ballots shall be sent in sealed packages with marks on the outside of the package clearly designating the polling place for which they are intended and the number of ballots enclosed.  Upon delivery of the package to him, the inspector shall return receipts therefor to the person from whom received.

Deviation: Missing

The concern arose from missing entries on the Early Voting Ballot Transport Statements (EVBTS) forms. These forms are used to investigate potential fraud by providing the who, what and when. This is a summary of the missing fields.

• 381 forms were missing fields out of 1,895 forms turned in.
• Of those 381 forms, the specific fields missing data are as follows:
  • 16 missing an audit signature
  • 19 missing a ballot count [assuming the form was signed with missing data]
  • 12 missing one of the two signatures required by courier/transport staff
  • 9 missing the signatures of both of courier/transport staff [both signatures are required]
  • 15 missing an Elections Department Receiver signature
  • "Other" missing documentation of security seals and lack of the two required seal numbers

Note: The inspector's use of the word "other" in a list intended to quantify the scope of deviations is curious given the topic, security seals.

All of these fields are used to document the chain of custody is applied, which ensures Election Integrity. Each of these missing signatures is not by itself a crime. However, in aggregate, the abundance of missing signatures suggests poor governance and challenges any MC Elections Department election integrity without an investigation to determine impact.

The AZ AG inspector did not report on any assessment of the forms signed by one of the two required couriers. Were all nine forms signed by the same person, which would raise suspicion of malintent. Any form missing a required signature raises the question of malintent but becomes more difficult to assess because there is no one to ask, since they weren't identified on the form.

Deviation: Missing Ballot Counts

When questioned, the MC Elections staff gave responses to questions about "Count of ballots in transport bins." They explained that prior to October 21, 2020 a ballot counter was used to determine the number of ballots being delivered to the Elections Department by the courier/transport staff. After October 21, 2020, the number of ballots received was estimated based on weight instead of using the ballot counter.

The inspector's interview with staff revealed that the number of ballots received became too large to utilize the ballot counter, inferring some type of compensatory measure was needed to ensure the pace was not slowed. Hence, the motivation or change was stated in the report.

The inspector did not describe how the change was implemented; the mechanism for change was vague. The inspector characterized it as "the decision was made," but failed to identify the person responsible for authorizing the change or the change process.

Deviation: Used Email instead of EVBTS Forms

After October 21, 2020, the ballot counts were recorded using email instead of the EVBTS forms. The timing of this change suggests the method of recording and transferring the ballot count data was made necessary because ballots were no longer counted. After October 21, 2020, ballot counts were estimated based on the weight of ballot boxes, not the ballot counter. The EVBTS form required a ballot count, which was missing on 19 forms. Unfortunately, the AZ AG inspector did not quantify the number of ballots affected by this change. Even if Maricopa Elections personnel provided the emailed accounts of scope to the inspector, these emails would not have provided the objective evidence needed by the inspector to track the chain of custody.

Deviation: Unfulfilled Party Representation Requirement for Couriers.

There

Arizona State and Maricopa County Election procedures require two carriers for ballots and the carriers for one route cannot be of the same polical

Potential Governance Gap(s):

• Principle 1 - Demonstrate Commitment to Integrity and Ethical Values
  • Attribute(s): 1.06, 1.08, 1.09, and 1.10
• Principle 2 - Exercise Oversight Responsibility
  • Attribute(s): 2.01
• Principle 3 - Establish Structure, Responsibility, and Authority
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 4 - Demonstrate Commitment to Competence
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 5 - Enforce Accountability
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 6 - Define Objectives and Risk Tolerances
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 7 - Identify, Analyze, and Respond to Risks
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 8 - Assess Fraud, Improper Payment, and Information
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 9 - Identify, Analyze, and Respond to Change
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 10 - Design Control Activities
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 11 - Design General Control Activities over Information
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 12 - Implement Control Activities
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 13 - Use Quality Information
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 14 - Communicate Internally
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 15 - Communicate Externally
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 16 - Perform Monitoring Activities
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 17 - Evaluate Issues and Remediate Deficiencies
  • Attribute(s):