Dropbox Collection (2020)

AZ Attorney General Investigation

Potential Governance Gaps were identified with the Arizona Attorney General's Office's 2020 General Election Investigation report. Drop Box Collection issues were investigated in Section 2 of this report, which address an Allegation that "Maricopa County Elections Department failed to maintain chain of custody. Properly document ballot retrieval, tansport and count of Drop-Off & Drop-Box ballots."

Investigation Finding

Election Procedure Violations: Maricopa County Election Officials failed to follow Maricopa County Election Department Procedures mandated by Arizona Secretary of State of Elections Procedures related to Ballot Drop-Off Locations and Drop-Boxes. Both Maricopa County and the State of Arizona have procedures to ensure the proper chain of custody documenting ballot movement from Drop-Off Locations to the County Elections Department. The following procedural violations were identified during the investigation [emphasis added by this assessment]:

• 2019 Election Procedure Manual section 1.7.b - For any election that includes a partisan race, at least two designated ballot retrievers of at least two differing party preferences shall be assigned to retrieve voted ballots from a ballot drop-box location or a drop box.
• 2019 Election Procedure Manual section 1.7.d - Upon arrival at the drop-box location or drop-box, the two designated ballot retrievers shall note, on a retrieval form prescribed by the County Recorder or officer in charge of elections, the location and/or unique identification number of the location of the location or drop-box and the date and time of arrival.
• 2019 Election Procedure Manual section 1.7.e - The time of departure from the drop-off location or drop-box shall be noted on the retrieval form.
• 2019 Election Procedure Manual section 1.7.f - The County Recorder or officer in charge of elections (or designee) shall inspect the secure ballot container for evidence of tampering and shall confirm receipt of the retrieved ballots by signing the retrieval form and indicating the date and time of receipt.
• 2019 Election Procedure Manual section 1.7.h - When the secure ballot container is opened by the County Recorder or officer in charge of elections (or designee), the number of ballots inside the container shall be counted and noted on the retrieval form.

Noteworthy Inspector Observations & Missing Observations

Voter Registration errors were evident based on an interview with the US Postal Service (USPS) Inspector. The inspector noted that 56,226 ballots were undeliverable.

No chain of custody for the undeliverable ballots was noted by the inspector. The inspector did not assess the security of the storage location; was access to these undelivered ballots controlled? Did the number of undelivered ballots match the number of ballots received by BlueEarth Secure Destruction Process. The date of transfer to BlueEarth Secure Destruction Process was not stated in the report.

No chain of custody was described for a file, which contained all of the addresses for the undelivered ballots. According to the USPS inspector, the file was transferred to the Maricopa County Elections Department and Runbeck Election Services. The USPS asserted that the Maricopa County Elections Department updated their databases to void those addresses, making the specific ballot invalid for voting. There was no mention of a procedure requirement. The inspector relied on secondhand information from the USPS in reaching the conclusion or at least inferring that the update was performed prior to the tabulation of ballots. The AZ AG's inspector did not interview the MC or Runbeck staff to confirm their databases had been updated. More importantly, the inspector did not determine the date when those undelivered ballots became invalid, assuming the MC Elections Department updated the files. (I believe the registration records are maintained by the MC Recorder's Office, not the MC Elections Department).

It seems that the likely that the USPS did not accumulate all of the undelivered ballots until after the date of the general election. Therefore, it seems unlikely that MC Recorders Office would have received the USPS file and made 56.226 ballots invalid while the election was taking place. Therefore, all or any portion of these undelivered ballots stored by the USPS could have been fraudulently submitted. Assuming some of the 56,226 undelivered ballots are stolen from the USPS storage facility, the Signature Verifier is the only barrier to prevent a fraudulent ballot from being tabulated. Meanwhile, the Signature Verifier is reviewing ballots at a pace of one ballot per seven seconds, which is noted in this same report, under the first allegation.

Potential Governance Gap(s):

• Principle 1 - Demonstrate Commitment to Integrity and Ethical Values
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 2 - Exercise Oversight Responsibility
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 3 - Establish Structure, Responsibility, and Authorit
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 4 - Demonstrate Commitment to Competence
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 5 - Enforce Accountability
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 6 - Define Objectives and Risk Tolerances
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 7 - Identify, Analyze, and Respond to Risks
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 8 - Assess Fraud, Improper Payment, and Information
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 9 - Identify, Analyze, and Respond to Change
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 10 - Design Control Activities
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 11 - Design General Control Activities over Information
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 12 - Implement Control Activities
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 13 - Use Quality Information
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 14 - Communicate Internally
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 15 - Communicate Externally
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 16 - Perform Monitoring Activities
  • Attribute(s):
• Principle 17 - Evaluate Issues and Remediate Deficiencies
  • Attribute(s):