Dropbox Collection (2020)
This page seeks to explain Maricopa Dropbox Collection (2020) anomalies as identified on the Election Anomalies page, which is a collection of various election-related anomalies that illustrate poor governance. Governance Gaps are reported on and compared to a standard so that you may visualize how poorly managed County services can have an adverse impact without any criminal wrongdoing. We chose the United States Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (also known as the Green Book) because it represents the ideal standard for governance practices since it is specifically written for government entities, not the business sector. Maricopa County has no obligation or commitments to adhere to any governance-related standards, including the Green Book. Regardless, the Green Book is a representation of what good governance looks like and deviations from that standard are worthy of consideration, not prosecution.
A diagram of one of many methods of compromising Election Integrity is shown of the Fraud Flow Diagram page. This page is devoted to understanding issues with Dropbox Collection anomalies within Maricopa County during the 2020 General Election, which includes Fraudulent Ballots Collected, Fraudulent Ballots Transported and Fraudulent Ballots Received from the Fraud Flow Diagram page
AZ Attorney General Investigation
Potential Governance Gaps were identified with the Arizona Attorney General's Office's 2020 General Election Investigation report. Drop Box Collection issues were investigated in Section 2 of this report, which address an Allegation that "Maricopa County Elections Department failed to maintain chain of custody. Properly document ballot retrieval, transport and count of Drop-Off & Drop-Box ballots."
The summary of the allegation is as follows;
Maricopa County Elections Department failed to maintain chain of custody. Properly document ballot retrieval, transport and count of Drop-Off & Drop-box ballots.
The AZ AG's inspector makes some interesting observations in Section 2 of the report, which are described below.
Just the Facts
The concern arose from missing entries on the Early Voting Ballot Transport Statements (EVBTS) forms. These forms are used to investigate potential fraud by providing the who, what and when. This is a summary of the missing fields.
- 381 forms were missing fields out of 1,895 forms turned in.
- Of those 381 forms, the specific fields missing data are as follows:
- 16 missing an audit signature
- 19 missing a ballot count
- 12 missing one of the two signatures required by courier/transport staff
- 9 missing both of the required courier/transport staff
- 15 missing an Elections Department Receiver signature
- "Other" missing documentation of security seals and lack of the two required seal numbers
Note: The inspector's use of the word "other" in a list intended to quantify the scope of deviations is curious given the topic, security seals.
All of these fields are used to document the chain of custody is applied, which ensures Election Integrity. Each of these missing signatures is not by itself a crime. However, in aggregate, the abundance of missing signatures suggests poor governance and challenges any MC Elections Department election integrity without an investigation to determine impact.
Missing Ballot Counts
When questioned, the MC Elections staff gave responses to questions about "Count of ballots in transport bins." They explained that prior to October 21, 2020 a ballot counter was used to determine the number of ballots being delivered to the Elections Department by the courier/transport staff. After October 21, 2020, ballots weigh ballots instead of using the ballot counter. Accordingly, the ballot counts were recorded using email instead of the EVBTS forms.
Do any of these inspector observations raise questions in your mind? They should!
- Why did they deviate from using the ballot counters?
- Why did they start using email to report ballot counts instead using the form?
- How were these changes justified?
- Who authorized these changes?
The inspector was able to present the following justification for these deviations:
- The number of ballots became too large to use the ballot counter.
- The change occurred as a result of "the decision" without explaining by who's authority the change was made.
- By inference, reporting the ballot counts by email was implemented because the form required information from the ballot counter, which was no longer being used.
Maricopa County & Arizona State Elections Procedures
The facts stated in this section are from the AZ AG's investigations. The inspector is presenting election-related requirements as specified in the Arizona Secretary of States (SOS) Elections Procedure Manual (EPM) and the Maricopa County Election Procedures. The AZ SOS EPM is accessible to the public from the AZ SOS website, including the 2019 SOS EPM edition, which would have been in place during the 2020 General Election. Maricopa County does not post their version of Election Procedures, which the AZ AG's inspector reviewed.
The following Arizona and Maricopa County requirements are stated in the inspector's report:
- When the secure ballot container is opened by the County Recorder or officer in charge of elections (or designee), the number of ballots inside the container shall be counted and noted on the retrieval form.
- For any election that includes a partisan race, at least two designated ballot retrievers of at least two differing party preferences shall be assigned to retrieve voted ballots from a ballot drop-off location or drop box.
Potential Governance Gap(s):
- Principle 1 - Demonstrate Commitment to Integrity and Ethical Values
- Principle 2 - Exercise Oversight Responsibility
- Attribute(s): 2.01
- Principle 3 - Establish Structure, Responsibility, and Authority
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 4 - Demonstrate Commitment to Competence
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 5 - Enforce Accountability
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 6 - Define Objectives and Risk Tolerances
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 7 - Identify, Analyze, and Respond to Risks
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 8 - Assess Fraud, Improper Payment, and Information
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 9 - Identify, Analyze, and Respond to Change
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 10 - Design Control Activities
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 11 - Design General Control Activities over Information
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 12 - Implement Control Activities
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 13 - Use Quality Information
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 14 - Communicate Internally
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 15 - Communicate Externally
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 16 - Perform Monitoring Activities
- Attribute(s):
- Principle 17 - Evaluate Issues and Remediate Deficiencies
- Attribute(s):
